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Why do traits come together? The underlying trait and network approaches
René Mõttus and Mike Allerhand
Department of Psychology and Centre for Cognitive Ageing and Cognitive Epidemiology,
University of Edinburgh, UK
Abstract
This chapter deals with one of the most pervasive personality-related phenomenon: the coalescence
of tendencies for specific thoughts, feelings and behaviors (characteristics) into broader patterns—
traits.  Two possible explanations are discussed. The more established explanation is that certain
characteristics tend to co-exist  because they reflect  a common underlying cause. A more recent
explanation is that they may also hang together because of having direct causal links between them
—some characteristics  can contribute to,  or inhibit,  others.  However, the chapter  offers a more
general,  mathematically  formalized  framework,  which  can,  in  fact,  merge  the  to  explanations.
Furthermore,  this  framework  can  be  used  to  represent  both  processes  within  individuals  and
individual differences, with the latter emerging from the former. This means potential for a formal
bridge between two branches of personality psychology—the social cognitive and trait approaches.
Some empirical findings will be reviewed that are consistent with the proposed framework. 
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Personality characteristics are more or less stable ways of feeling, thinking, and behaving. One of
the most persistent observations is that they come in patterns: some characteristic levels are more
likely to co-exist than others. We start the chapter by reviewing the long-dominant explanation for
this phenomenon: the existence of relatively few and distinct underlying traits, each of which causes
multiple personality characteristics. We will go on by arguing that empirical evidence supporting
the underlying trait paradigm is currently not unequivocal. Likewise, the explanatory scope of this
paradigm may be somewhat limited, as it does not accommodate theories as to how psychological
processes  happening within  individuals  intersect  with,  or  lead  to,  individual  differences.  These
limitations  leave  room for  complementary  perspectives.  One of  them is  the  network approach,
which posits personality as a dynamical system of interconnected characteristics. This approach can
account  for  the  clustering  of  personality  characteristics  and individual  differences  by means  of
within-individual processes. However, this approach is far less parsimonious. Towards the end of
the chapter, we will offer a more general, mathematically formalized framework that combines the
two approaches.
The broad trait paradigm
For decades, a dominant paradigm of personality research has been that of broad personality traits
that  encompass  individual  differences  in  wide  ranges  of  behaviors,  feelings  and  thoughts  (see
McCrae,  this  volume).  This  is  why  the  term  trait will  be  exclusively  used  to  refer  to  broad
personality constructs in this chapter. Journals routinely publish articles on a number of trait-related
questions,  including  their  structure  (Laverdière,  Morin,  &  St-Hilaire,  2013),  variation  across
demographic groups (Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, & Allik, 2008) or geographical locations (Schmitt,
Allik, McCrae, & Benet-Martinez, 2007), correlations with life outcomes (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner,
Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007), or correspondence to neuronal (Bjørnebekk et al., 2013) and genomic
variations (de Moor et al., 2012). 
Traits are population structures although often interpreted as pertaining to individuals
A major reason for such pervasive focus on traits  is  that specific  behaviors,  thoughts,  feelings,
motives,  attitudes,  values—the stuff  that  personality  is  made of,  or  becomes  manifest  through,
which we generically refer to as personality characteristics—tend to vary across people in certain
patterns. For example, a person who is rated as above average in moodiness is also likely to appear
commensurately anxious and prone to feeling helpless, whereas a chatty person is also expected to
feel positive emotions and be up for adventures. A parsimonious explanation for such clustering is
that the co-occurring characteristics reflect some shared underlying etiology. Moody people also
being anxious and feeling helpless may be because these specific characteristics reflect a broader
underlying propensity (trait) for negative emotions known as Neuroticism. And if so, it makes sense
to focus on these underlying traits rather than on the multitude of their manifestations, for both
practical  (simplicity)  and  theoretical  (parsimony)  purposes.  If  this  hypothesis  is  correct,  then
personality  ought  to  be  a  relatively  small  set  of  real  attributes  possessed  by  individuals  that
correspond to some stable parameters of their nervous systems and are more or less universal across
the human kind—and possibly beyond. 
Metaphorically,  the  underlying  traits  can  be  thought  of  as  hidden  'generators'  that,  perhaps  in
interaction with situations, produce the observable regularities that appear as traits and are thereby
captured  using personality  trait  questionnaires.  Individual  differences  in  the  trait  manifestations
largely result from differences in the power of these 'generators.' This metaphor parallels how traits
are often modeled using structural equation modeling, where hypothetical latent entities, denoted by
circles,  cause  their  indicators,  denoted  by  rectangles  (Figure  1).  The  indicators  only  co-exist
because of sharing the underlying cause: if all individuals were equal on the underlying traits, they
would not cluster in any ways.
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Figure 1. The model of a trait as an underlying cause of its associated characteristics (a, b, c, d,
and e). This is how personality traits are mostly represented in structural equation models.
In a vast  majority  of studies,  either  some form of factor  analysis  (FA) or principal  component
analysis  (PCA) is  used to study how personality  characteristics  cluster  into what could then be
interpreted as reflections of underlying traits. Mostly, differences between individuals measured at
one particular point of time are analyzed. Less often, patterns of variation within individuals are
investigated (Mõttus, Epskamp, & Francis, in press), in which case it is expected that fluctuations in
the underlying trait levels over time and situations (or due to experimental manipulations, for that
matter) lead to their associated characteristics fluctuating in concert. When individuals are moodier
than is typical for them, they should also be commensurately more anxious than usual because
moodiness  and  anxiety  are  hypothesized  to  reflect  the  same  underlying  trait.  Other  types  of
evidence for particular characteristics reflecting underlying common causes such as consistency in
their developmental trajectories have been even less frequently used to carve out traits, although
developmental consistency also appears to be a necessary property of etiologically unitary traits
(Cattell, 1946). 
However, as the old adage goes, correlation does imply causation. Patterns of clustering may have
different causes. Therefore, to interpret principal components (or factors, for that matter) extracted
from correlational data that pertain to individual differences as indicative of underlying attributes of
these individuals (i.e.,  causal structures within them that can cause something) is not, in fact, a
straightforward inference. One way to see this is to review the mechanics of PCA—and effectively
FA. (We will come back to something similar later in the chapter, so there is even more reason to
get to grips with PCA.) 
We can think of PCA as a procedure that projects individuals into a multidimensional space spanned
by k orthogonal dimensions. These dimensions correspond to the k observed personality variables
being analyzed. For example, the variables can be items or facets (clusters of similar items) of a
personality test. For convenience, we can assume that all variables can be centered at zero and have
unit variance. Each individual can be represented as a point in this personality space, with their
coordinates  being  their  values  on  the  measured  variables.  Equivalently, each  individual  can  be
thought of as a vector starting from the origin and ending in the location with the said coordinates.
Put this way, each individual is characterized by the direction and length of their person vector, in
relation to those of the other individuals represented in this space. Collectively, the person vectors
thus represent the population structure of the personality feature space. PCA attempts to identify
orthogonal  dimensions  in  this  space  along  which  individuals  tend  to  vary  the  most.  These
dimensions are also vectors (eigenvectors), although they are called principal components. The first
principal component vector projects into the space in the direction to which the person vectors most
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often  point  and  that  therefore  has  the  greatest  variance  in  their  lengths.  Extracting  the  first
component means removing all the variance in person vector lengths in this particular direction—so
that we can think of the space being squeezed “flat” in this particular direction. Using the variability
in the remaining dimensions, subsequent principal component vectors are extracted in exactly the
same way, until all the variance has been removed. 
I deliberately used the term vector to denote both people and principal components. This helps to
see that the principal component vectors are essentially abstractions of person vectors, describing
popular directions among them. They summarize clusters in the population structure and thereby
pertain to differences (or similarities, if you will) between people. For example, Figure 2 (left panel)
represents a situation where there is no ordered population structure, with no one direction being
more popular among the person vectors than any other. In such a case, no principal components
would usefully summarize directions of person vectors. In the middle panel of Figure 2, in contrast,
person vectors have a popular direction and a principal component can usefully summarize such
clustering of person vectors. Naturally, there might be more than one popular direction that can be
summarized  by corresponding principal  components  (right panel  of Figure 2).  This  is  the most
realistic scenario for a personality space.
Figure 2. Person vectors in three-dimensional feature space.
The components,  however, may say little  about  the  structure of  the  measured  attributes
within individuals,  because  the  population  clustering  may  result  from  more  than  one  kind  of
mechanisms.  Personality  vectors  may  point  in  particular  directions  because  of  some  universal
processes within individuals that cause some of the personality features tend to gravitate toward
similar values independently of other characteristics (reflecting their unique underlying common
cause), which translates into some configurations of personality features and thereby directions of
person vectors being more popular than some others. This would be the underlying trait scenario. 
But the clustering may also happen due to other reasons. For example, some configurations
of  personality  characteristics  (and  thereby  directions  in  personality  space)  may  reflect
environmental niches toward which groups of people tend to gravitate. Or, individuals may interact
based on their pre-existing personality features and become more similar over time, which may also
cause  some  directions  of  personality  vectors  to  become  more  popular  than  others.  If  so,  the
tendencies for particular personality characteristics to co-exist may be rather incidental in the sense
that there may be no common cause for specifically these particular characteristics.  Finally, the
network approach,  described  in  more  detail  below, posits  that  personality  characteristics  might
directly influence each other, suggesting that some characteristics may tend to have similar values
not because of an underlying common cause, or because of any common cause external to them, but
because they “top up” each other.
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A recurrent population structure
It is often suggested that population variance in personality characteristics can be efficiently
summarized along five directions, known as the Five-Factor Model (FFM) traits of Neuroticism,
Extraversion,  Openness  to  Experience,  Agreeableness,  and Conscientiousness  (McCrae  & John,
1992). The FFM has been recovered across numerous studies and cultures (Allik, Realo, & McCrae,
2013),  at  least  when the pool of measured trait  indicators  is pre-specified,  as is  the case when
standardized and carefully adapted personality questionnaires that are pre-designed to measure the
particular combinations of personality characteristics are used and data reduction techniques such as
PCA are applied (McCrae & Terracciano, 2005). 
These  findings  are  not  trivial:  there  is  no  a  priori reason  why  certain  personality
characteristics should co-exist in a given culture even if researchers have specifically chosen to
model the characteristics that tend to co-exist in some other culture. If the popular directions in
personality  space  reflected  some  sort  of  environmental  niches,  these  surely  could  vary  across
cultural contexts. Therefore, in addition to cross-cultural replicability constituting strong evidence
for  the  usefulness  of  the  FFM  traits  for  summarizing individual  differences  in  personality
characteristics in a variety of contexts, it may also be evidence for the traits being ontologically
“real”. Yet there are some potential concerns.
First, the replication of the FFM appears somewhat poorer when traits are defined de novo in
each culture rather than being recovered from pre-defined questionnaires (De Raad et al., 2014).
This may suggest that some of the apparent cross-cultural replicability may have been designed into
the  studies  (Saucier  et  al.,  2014).  The  replication  may  also  be  poorer  when  rarely  addressed
indigenous societies are studied (Gurven, von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan, & Lero Vie, 2013).
Some authors have suggested that two (Saucier et al., 2014), three (De Raad et al., 2010, 2014), or
six (Ashton & Lee, 2007) components—which sometimes do overlap with the FFM traits—provide
the most robust way to describe the population structure of personality characteristics. The degree
of replication may also depend on which statistical methods are used. For example, while some
studies (e.g., McCrae & Terracciano, 2005) have used PCA followed by targeted rotation (McCrae,
Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & Paunonen, 1996), attempts to use arguably more modern statistical
methods to test for factorial invariance across cultures point to poorer replication (Thalmayer &
Saucier, 2014).
Second, FFM measures that are designed to recover the five FFM traits as clearly as possible
demonstrate complex population structures even in their original cultural contexts, with individuals'
person vectors systematically deviating from directions that would correspond to the FFM traits. In
other  words,  items  or  facets  correlate  with multiple  FFM traits  at  the  same time (Hopwood &
Donnellan, 2010) and scales lack local independence by correlating even when there appears to be
no variance in their ostensibly underlying traits (Gignac, Bates, & Jang, 2007). On one hand, this
may seem like some nuisance that can be easily dismissed: measurements could be contaminated by
systematic  biases,  which  does  not  necessarily  undermine  the  trait  model  that  underlies  these
measurements. After all, no measurment is perfect. On the other hand, the ontological status of the
FFM traits hinge on how clearly they can be identified from data because this is how they were
postulated in the first place. Therefore, the measurements of FFM also constitute the main means of
falsifying the model.  
Tackling some of the complexities of trait conceptualization and measurement, it is widely
accepted that at different levels of abstraction different personality constructs are appropriate. That
is, from a trait perspective personality is thought to have a hierarchical structure (Markon, Krueger,
& Watson, 2005), ranging from one or two overarching constructs (DeYoung, 2006; Rushton, Bons,
& Hur, 2008) to very specific characteristics reflected in single test items (McCrae, 2015; Mõttus,
Kandler, Bleidorn, Riemann, & McCrae, in press). This trait representation can account for why
most personality characteristics correlate to some extent (van der Linden, te Nijenhuis, & Bakker,
2010), subsets of them correlate more highly, some subsets of these subsets yet more highly, and so
on. Arguably, however, when virtually any trait can be split into further parts which then can be split
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into yet further parts, and so on, deciding which particular combination of traits to focus on for
whatever practical or conceptual purpose will become a very difficult decision. Also, one of the
primary  strength  of  the  underlying  trait  paradigm,  parsimony, somewhat  dissolves  in  the  trait
hierarchy, as a series of underlying influences need to be postulated across its levels.
More arguments regarding the reality of traits
Three other types of evidence are often cited for the reality of personality traits: heritability,
at least moderate cross-rater agreement, and moderate to high rank-order stability (Funder, 1991;
McCrae  et  al.,  2004;  McCrae  & Costa,  2008a).  All  of  them seem to  provide  support  for  the
descriptive utility of broad traits—that these traits can be useful for describing these properties of
human personality. However, one may argue that these types of evidence may not speak for the
reality of the traits after all.
As for heritability, twin-studies have shown that about 40% of the phenotypic variance in
the FFM traits can be attributed to genetic similarity between individuals (Vukasovic & Bratko,
2015).  Likewise,  the  covariation  structure  of  traits  has  shown  to  be  heritable  (McCrae,  Jang,
Livesley, Riemann, & Angleitner, 2001), such that, for example, cheerfulness of one twin tends to
co-vary with talkativeness of another twin (commonly referred as genetic correlation). However,
heritability cannot be taken as evidence for one collection of characteristics being more likely to
represent  a  real  trait  than  any  other.  This  is  because  heritability  might  be  the  property  of  the
characteristics that are aggregated into traits rather than pertain to whatever (underlying or not) the
aggregate is assumed to represent. Indeed, individual personality test items are heritable, often even
when the variance of the FFM traits has been removed from them (Mõttus, Kandler, et al., in press).
As per the First Law of Behavior Genetics, everything is heritable (Turkheimer, 2000)—as long as
behavioral traits are concerned, anyway. For example, even pseudo traits that have been compiled
from theoretically unrelated but heritable variables are to a substantial degree heritable (Johnson,
Penke, & Spinath, 2011). 
Likewise, the presence of a genetic correlation does not necessarily show involvement of
overlapping genes in the etiology of two variables as is sometimes mistakenly assumed because the
genetic factors underlying one variable may bleed into another via a phenotypic causation (Johnson
et al., 2011). For example, one characteristic may mediate the heritable influences of another such
as smoking mediates the effect of some genetic variants on lung cancer (that is, what appear as
genetic variants for cancer gene are actually genetic variants for smoking that causes cancer). As a
result,  although  the  FFM  structure  can  be  recovered  from  genetic  correlations,  this  does  not
necessarily mean that the genetic effects on measured variables are mediated by latent factors as
would be predicted by the underlying trait model (Franic, Borsboom, Dolan, & Boomsma, 2014;
but see also Lewis & Bates, 2014). Also, the popular directions among person vectors that the FFM
factors  summarize  might  reflect  popular  genetic  configurations  of  psychological  characteristics.
That  is,  it  is  the  directions of  person  vectors  that  might  be  heritable  rather  than  something
underlying some specific sets of the characteristics that constitute these directions.
As with heritability, cross-rater agreement and rank-order stability may also pertain to the
characteristics that are aggregated into traits rather than to the traits themselves. In fact, individual
test items are agreed upon by different raters even when trait variance has been removed from them
(Mõttus,  McCrae,  Allik,  &  Realo,  2014).  The  same  argument  probably  applies  for  predictive
validity of personality traits, which has also been used to “empower” traits (Roberts et al., 2007).
For  a  parallel  illustration,  although  high  socioeconomic  status  (a  composite  score  of,  say,
educational level, occupational status, income, neighborhood quality) is correlated with just about
every good thing in life, it would be presumptuous to think that the indicators of socioeconomic
status are only correlated because of an underlying common cause. In fact, it is even possible that
pseudo traits consisting of items that measure different (FFM) traits would generally show higher
predictive  validity  than traits  that  consist  of  similar  items,  given that  the  aggregated  items  are
relevant for the outcome. This is because combinations of different items then encompass more
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outcome-relevant content than combinations of similar items.
Traits are snapshots
A potential  limitation  of the underlying  trait  perspective  is  that  its  explanatory  scope is
limited to the description of static individual differences. Hardly anyone would doubt that humans
are complex and dynamic systems embedded in environments that they themselves choose, modify,
and  react  to.  If  so,  any  comprehensive  account  of  human  personality  has  to  account  for  this
complexity and dynamism. Although trait  models can provide efficient  descriptive snapshots of
individual differences, they have little to say on how individuals operate from moment to moment
in interaction with each other and their surroundings and how, at any given moment, these processes
underlie  and spring  from their  relatively  static  trait-standings.  According  to  McCrae and Costa
(2008a),  “… if  one  wishes  to  understand  the  processes  that  lead  to  the  flow of  behavior  and
experience  in  individual  people,  trait  psychology is  a  limited  guide”  (p.  288).  Of  course,  trait
theories can and have been expanded to account for phenomena other than the relatively static traits
—for example, the characteristic adaptations and other phenomena encompassed by the Five-Factor
Theory (McCrae & Costa, 2008b; McCrae, this volume)—but there are currently few theories that
explain how individual differences in personality characteristics and co-variation patterns in these
can emerge from the processes happening with individuals.
Of course, the trait approach with its predominant focus on static individual differences is
not the only approach to personality, although it,  arguably, has dominated the research field for
decades. Some other approaches, grounded in social psychology (Cervone, 2004; Mischel & Shoda,
1995), have for the most part  been exactly  the opposites of the trait  approach, focusing on the
processes  within  individuals  with  relatively  little  systematic  attention  to  how  these  specific
processes  can  give  rise  to  the  broad  phenomena  of  individual  differences  that  interest  trait
researchers. The field of human personality research has therefore been characterized by a chasm
that has not exactly helped with the emergence of a comprehensive view of what personality is and
how it works (Fleeson, 2012; Mischel & Shoda, 1998; McCrae, 2009). One reason for this chasm
may  be  that  there  has  been  little  in  the  way  of  a  formal  framework  for  connecting  the  two
approaches. This may be changing, however, as the network approach attempts precisely that—to
provide  one  framework  for  combining  the  within-  and between-individual  sides  of  personality
psychology.
The network approach
According  to  the  network  perspective  on  personality  (Cramer  et  al.,  2012),  personality
characteristics  can  have  “causal,  homeostatic  or  logical”  (p  .415)  associations  between  them
(Schmittmann et al., 2013). In the network language, the elements of the network are referred to as
nodes (here,  personality  characteristics)  and  positive  or  negative  edges between  them  (here,
associations between personality characteristics). The edges can be directed depicting how causality
is  expected  to flow, or undirected,  simply denoting associations  without  specifying the flow of
causation.  For visual ease,  positive edges can be shown in green and negative edges in red.  A
hypothetical network of the associations between five nodes is depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3.  A hypothetical network of five personality characteristics (a, b, c, d, and e) and their
relationships. The characteristics are referred to as nodes and their relationships as edges. Positive
edges are often shown in green and negative edges in red.
For a concrete example,  sadness, anger, and impulsive behavior may co-vary because of
reciprocal associations between them. Doing things that will be regretted afterwards may contribute
to low mood and anger, and lashing out angrily may lead to feeling sadness afterwards. To the
extent that all of these combinations of causal associations, or at least some of them, are consistent
across individuals, this may contribute to the co-variation pattern that we interpret as Neuroticism.
Note that as in Figure 3, not all nodes of this hypothetical network have direct edges between them.
As I will describe below, the purpose of the network analysis is delineating the unique associations
among variables rather than general correlation patterns. 
Personality characteristics may co-vary even if they do not have direct links between them
but because they share the sets of other elements to which they are connected. First, they may have
indirect  causal  associations:  being  self-disciplined  may  be  indirectly  associated  with  being
gregarious because it contributes to appearing reliable—something that helps with making friends
and thereby having people around. Second, there may be spurious correlations due to shared co-
variates: being self-disciplined may also correlate with gregariousness because of shared negative
contributions from sadness and anxiety. Another example of spurious correlations comes from the
functionalist explanation for the coalescence of traits (Wood, Gardner, & Harms, 2015). According
to this perspective, what are typically considered personality characteristics co-vary because they
are  linked  with  overlapping  functionality  indicators  (self-perceived  abilities,  expectancies,  and
valuation):  the same goals can be achieved in multiple  ways and the same behaviors can serve
multiple  goals.  When  we  consider  the  functionality  indicators  as  nodes  of  the  psychological
network that appears as personality, they will become the causes of spurious correlations among
personality characteristics. 
Moreover,  characteristics  that  are  traditionally  associated  with  different  purported
(underlying)  traits  can have direct  or indirect  associations  between them. For example,  keeping
promises (a component of Conscientiousness measures) may tend to have a causal association with
being seen as co-operative (a component of Agreeableness measures), or consuming culture (tapped
by Openness measures) may help to make friends (asked about in Extraversion measures). This may
contribute to the commonly observed correlations between the measures of these traits; for example,
the  correlations  between  Conscientiousness  and  Agreeableness  measures,  or  Openness  and
Extraversion  measures,  typically  exceed  .30  (van  der  Linden  et  al.,  2010;  for  comparison,
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correlations between measures of the same traits are typically around .60, Pace & Brannick, 2010). 
Thus, the crucial difference between the underlying trait and network explanations for the
coalescence of traits  is this.  According to the former, the correlation between, say, sadness and
anger  is  entirely due  to a  common cause,  the underlying  propensity  that  we may want  to  call
Neuroticism. If the correlation does not vanish after controlling for the underlying trait level (i.e.,
there is lack of local independence), a new lower-level underlying trait needs to be postulated that
accounts  for  this  residual  correlation.  According  to  the  network  perspective,  in  contrast,  the
correlation between sadness and anger may result from a direct causal association among them as
well as from shared influences from other components of the network. If so, there is no need to
worry about local independence or different levels of causal influences (i.e., the trait hierarchy).
Although  the  network  approach  can,  in  principle,  do  away  with  the  underlying  traits
altogether,  a  priori precluding  any  unmodeled  causal  factors  (i.e.,  underlying  traits)  seems  an
unnecessarily restrictive stance and is not inevitably required. Essentially, the shared contributions
from other variables—whether explicitly included among the nodes or not—serve the function of
common causes for two or more nodes. If the shared contributions do not happen to be explicitly
modeled, they become “underlying” by definition. Put differently, should the underlying variables
be  fleshed  out  in  sufficient  detail  at  some  point  (e.g.,  we  will  know  all  bits  that  make  up
Neuroticism), their elements can become modeled as parts of the personality network. As a result, it
appears  that  the  network  operationalization  of  personality  is  a  more  general  one  that  can,  in
principle, accommodate the underlying trait approach.
The network approach combines individual differences and within-individual processes
According to the underlying trait perspective, personality is represented as a set of scores of
latent  variables  and  their  correlations  with  the  observed  personality  characteristics  (as  well  as
intercepts  and  [residual]  variances,  but  for  simplicity  these  can  be  ignored  for  now).  The
correlations (factor loadings) are effectively estimates of how reliably the characteristics reflect the
latent traits. Because the latent scores are unknown, they are approximated by the sum-scores of
appropriate observed variables, possibly weighed by their hypothetical correlations with the latent
variables.  Essentially,  thus,  the  personality  representation  amounts  to  a  set  of  underlying  trait
scores. Because within-individual processes are not an inherent part of such trait models, the scores
are assumed to be relatively stable over moderately long periods of time, even though external (to
traits) factors that may cause gradual changes in the scores, via some unknown mechanisms, are
often sought after (Specht et al., 2014). 
According to the network perspective, personality is a more dynamic phenomena: the nodes,
or personality  characteristics,  are,  at  least  in theory, constantly updated by positive or negative
influences  from other  nodes,  be  these  explicitly  modeled  or  not,  or  from the  respective  nodes
themselves  at  previous  time-point.  As a  result,  if  we choose to  model  personality  processes  as
discrete steps (if only for convenience), at any given time personality can be represented as its state
at the previous time-point that has been updated by the connections among the nodes (including
contributions  from  the  nodes  themselves).  Therefore,  this  personality  representation  has  two
components: node scores and their connections. The former is simply a vector, say, y of length k for
each individual p (yp). This part of personality representation corresponds to the observed variables
in the underlying trait representations before these have been aggregated into trait scores, although
there is one important difference: node scores can change from moment-to-moment in the network
conceptualization  but  the  observed  variables  are  expected  to  be  stable  in  the  underlying  trait
paradigm, as otherwise the reliability  of measurement  would be compromised.  The connections
between the nodes can be encoded in a  k  by  k weight  matrix  W.  The rule  that  connects  each
individual's (p) vector of scores and the weight matrix is yt = yt-1W, where t stands for time. This is
how the network representation of personality can formally connect individual differences, encoded
in  the  vector  of  node  scores,  and  within-individual  processes,  encoded  in  the  weight  matrix.
Individual differences are therefore the result of within-individual processes.
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This  personality  representation  is  consistent  with how some personality  trait  researchers
conceive of traits. For example, the Whole Trait Theory (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2010) posits that
traits have two parts. First, the descriptive part constitutes of the distributions of personality states
(personality characteristics, in our terminology). Secondly, the explanatory parts consists of all sorts
of underlying mechanisms that contribute to the variance and co-variance of the states over time
and across situations. It is just that the network approach formalizes the latter part in more concrete
terms.
The off-diagonal elements of the weight matrix  W  can be either positive or negative,  in
which case the corresponding characteristics top up or take off from each other, respectively, or
zero, in which case there is no link between the corresponding characteristics. The diagonal of the
weight  matrix  represents  “self-loops”,  which  represent  the  (autoregressive)  stability  of  the
corresponding characteristics—or, put alternatively, their resistance to the influences from the other
characteristics. If personality is completely stable, then all off-diagonal elements of  W are zero,
while all diagonal elements are 1.
If the matrix denotes causal processes, it is non-symmetric, with rows encoding connections
that  the  corresponding  characteristics  send  out  to  other  characteristics  and  columns  encoding
incoming connections from them. A symmetric matrix encodes non-directional connections, which
may be a useful way of representing associations when we cannot, or prefer not to, specify the
direction of causal flow. For example, when the data being analyzed is cross-sectional, directional
connections cannot be estimated because causal processes are likely to take time. In this case,  W
represents  “average”  connection  strengths  over  time,  in  whatever  direction  the  causality  flows.
Alternatively, in longitudinal data the testing intervals may be too long to meaningfully delineate
causal processes (e.g., doing something silly may not be particularly likely to contribute to sadness
3 years later unless the silly deed was something particularly dramatic).
W can be specified as invariant across individuals, but it can also be allowed to vary across
them (Wp). In the latter case, we end up with having two kinds of individual differences: scores of
personality characteristic at any point of time and processes that connect and thereby update these
characteristics. In other words, individuals may not only differ in the values of their personality
characteristic at any given time but also in the processes that give rise to these values. However,
because the scores depend on the connections,  the latter  are more important  for describing and
understanding personality. For individual differences in  W to become estimable, time-series data
can be used, where individuals are measured repeatedly over time-intervals that are short enough
for meaningfully revealing such causal processes. For example,  increasingly popular experience
sampling studies, wherein individuals are asked to report on their personality characteristics several
times a day, are well suited for this purpose. 
Recently, Epskamp and colleagues (2016) proposed a multi-level framework that allows for
simultaneously  representing,  and  empirically  estimating,  three  different  kinds  of  relationships
between psychological characteristics. First, the framework consists of a directed network encoding
autoregressive and cross-lagged associations among the nodes; this network is suggestive of the
stability and change-causing causal processes happening within individuals. As is typical in multi-
level models, this network is estimated as a set of fixed effects (representing average associations
across  individuals)  and  (individual-specific)  deviations  from  these.  Second,  the  framework
represents within-individual contemporaneous associations among the variables, conditional on the
autoregressive and cross-lagged links; again, fixed effects and their variability can be estimated.
This (undirected) network of associations is suggestive of whatever processes that unfold quickly
and  therefore  cannot  be  captured  by  the  lag  intervals.  Third,  the  framework  allows  estimating
associations that pertain to individual differences—how average levels of characteristics tend to co-
vary across individuals.  These estimates correspond to the factor-analytic  work done within the
underlying trait  approach.  Because these processes are  not necessarily  indicative  of causality—
average sadness may not be causally related to  average anxiety, over and above the time-lagged
associations  already  modeled  at  within-individual  variance  level—these  associations  are
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represented as an undirected network.
Epskamp and colleagues (2016) exemplified their approach by analyzing the associations
among  17  personality  characteristics  pertaining  to  the  Neuroticism,  Extraversion,  and
Conscientiousness domains and physical exercising. Each of these variables was measured several
times each day. Among the notable findings, the personality characteristics clustered according to
their FFM traits in all three networks. This is consistent with the possibilities that the coalescence of
the  measured  characteristics  into  FFM-type  traits  may  partially  result  from  direct  causal
associations  among (consistently  with the basic idea of the network approach)  them and partly
reflect unmodeled influences shared among them (consistently with the underlying trait idea), and
that between-individual associations may reflect the results of these processes. Further, physical
activity  was associated with several characteristics,  but the associations  varied according to the
network type. For example, individuals who on average reported more energy exercised more often
and (around the time) when individuals where exercising they also felt more energetic than usually.
However, temporal associations revealed a more intricate pattern: while exercising tended to be
preceded by feeling more energetic than usual it was followed by feeling less energetic. Indeed,
exercising may be exhausting.
Therefore, compared to the underlying trait approach, the network approach allows for a
richer way of representing associations between personality characteristics and their associations
with variables outside the personality domain (e.g., exercising or whatever other situational factors).
This representation combines between-individual differences with within-individual processes that
unfold over time or happen (almost) contemporaneously. This way of approaching personality can
yield insights that would be hard to gain by relying only on an underlying trait-only approach.
When appropriate data is available, these representations can also be empirically operationalized
and tested. 
The network approach can yield new insights from existing data
The network approach is flexible in that it can also be used to re-model the kinds of data that
dominates  the  underlying  trait  paradigm:  cross-sectional  responses  to  questionnaire  items
(Costantini et al., 2015). Specifically, the correlation matrix of the personality characteristic can be
represented as a network. Although these analyses offer less added value over traditional techniques
compared  with  analyses  based  on  data  with  repeated  measurements,  they  offer  some  possible
benefits such as outlining the unique associations among variables (by striving for sparse networks)
or identifying the most “central” characteristics. 
Sparsity
As said above, personality characteristics can be correlated for various reasons according to
the network approach: directly, indirectly, or spuriously due to overlapping influences. Many, if not
most, of the correlations are therefore uninformative when the purpose is to disentangle plausible
causal associations. As a result, network-approach based representations of personality seek to get
rid of extensive correlation patterns. The desired property of networks to contain only relatively few
edges is called sparsity. In a sparse network, the edges that arise from confounded or indirect causal
relationships  are  removed.  Note  that  the  strive  for  sparsity  contrasts  with  the  underlying  trait
approach, which assumes that the manifestations of the same underlying traits are all correlated—
this phenomena is the very evidence for the trait. 
One way to make a  network sparse is  to transform the correlation matrix  into a partial
correlation matrix. Partial correlations represent residual associations when all other correlations in
the network have been taken into account. For example, this can be done by using the Gaussian
Graphical Model (Lauritzen, 1996). In order to even more effectively shrink weak edges that are
likely to reflect nuisance co-variance or otherwise uninteresting information to zero, LASSO-family
procedures  such  as  the  graphical  LASSO  (Friedman,  Hastie,  &  Tibshirani,  2008)  or  adaptive
LASSO (Zou, 2006) can be used. For networks that contain temporal information—autoregressive
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and cross-lagged associations—multi-level vector autoregressive models can be used (Epskamp et
al., 2016).
By focusing on sparse networks and therefore the unique associations among personality
characteristics, the network approach can also add value to the analyses of cross-sectional data, over
and above methods stemming from the underlying trait approach such as PCA or FA. For example,
pockets of characteristics that are associated over and above the variance they share with any other
characteristics  can be identified and subjected to further conceptual  or empirical  analysis.  Such
pockets can suggest facets or nuances for traits.
Centrality and other network properties
Networks can be characterized by various local (pertaining to some areas of the network) or global
(pertaining  to  the  whole  network)  properties,  which  can  also  add  value  to  representing  and
understanding personality processes. For example, nodes can be characterized by their centrality,
which quantifies their relative importance: some nodes emit and/or transmit more information than
others and removing (or changing) them will likely have consequences that spread throughout the
network.  For  instance,  intervention  attempts  may  want  to  focus  on  characteristics  that  are
particularly central in  the personality systems of individuals because changing these characteristics
is  especially  likely to cause widespread and possibly even lasting change. At the same time,  it
exactly the central characteristics that may be particularly hard to change as they are connected to
so many other characteristics and are thereby constantly pulled back towards their typical values
based on the state of system as a whole. 
Note that there is some correspondence between the centrality of nodes in the network approach and
component/factor loadings in PCA/FA because characteristics that are more strongly linked with
others are also likely to have higher correlations with other characteristics, thereby entailing higher
loadings. However, centrality and loadings are conceptually very different properties, because the
latter  are  indicators  of  how  reliably  the  characteristic  reflects  an  underlying  trait  rather  than
indicators  of  direct  relationships  among  them.  In  the  underlying  trait  approach,  changing  a
characteristic does not change the trait that causes it and therefore changing characteristics with
high loadings is expected to be of no more consequence than changing characteristics with low
factor loadings. For a parallel situation, imagine that Wellington boots and, in particular, umbrellas
are results, and thereby indicators, of rain: alas, putting on the boots or even carrying an umbrella
are unlikely to have any influence on whether it rains or not. For a different example, imagine that
an underlying trait corresponds to something like human immunodeficiency virus (HIV): treating its
symptoms will not remove the virus.
Among  different  types  of  centrality  indices,  degree  centrality  quantifies  the  strength  of  the
connections  incident  to  a  node  (absolute  connection  strength  across  all  nodes).  Nodes  with
relatively higher degree centralities may have larger direct influences on other nodes or receive
more of such influences. On the other hand, closeness centrality is the inverse of the distances of the
focal node to all other nodes in the network: if something happens in the network and the influence
starts spreading, nodes with high closeness centrality will be affected more quickly than those with
low closeness centrality. Another popular index of centrality is the betweenness centrality, which
quantifies the extent to which a node “sits” on the shortest connections between any pair of nodes in
the network. Removal of a node high in betweenness centrality may be particularly consequential
because the shortest paths between many pairs of nodes will increase and therefore the propagation
of  influences  throughout  the  network  slows.  For  more  detailed  information  on  centrality,  see
Costatini and colleagues (2014).
Among  the  global  network  properties,  small-worldness  (Watts  &  Strogatz,  1998)  should  be
mentioned.  Small-world networks are characterized by clusters of densely connected nodes and
links that connect these otherwise distant clusters. If a network demonstrates small-worldness, this
means that the changes generally propagate quickly throughout the network because it takes only a
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few  intermediate  nodes  to  get  from  any  node  to  any  other  node.  For  example,  it  could  be
hypothesized that individuals whose personality networks demonstrate the small-world property are
more reactive to changes (such as psychotherapy or stress) because influences targeted at specific
characteristics  are  more likely to propagate throughout  their  personality  systems—perhaps even
when the target characteristics are not particularly central. The symptoms of psychiatric disorders
demonstrate small-worldness which may explain the high rates of co-morbidity among the disorders
(Borsboom, Cramer, Schmittmann, Epskamp, & Waldorp, 2011). In the same way, small-worldness
might, in principle, explain the often-substantial inter-correlations of personality traits such as those
of the FFM (van der Linden et al., 2010) or the general factor of psychopathology (Caspi et al.
2014).
Equilibrium with environment as a cause of stability
According to the underlying trait approach, personality is represented as stable individual
differences and can be modeled through data that has been generated by one or a few measurement
occasions for each participant.  In such a model,  associations between personality characteristics
tend to be represented (or approximated) as linear. As said above, the network approach conceives
of personality as a dynamical system that evolves over time and across situations. When thinking of
dynamic systems represented by potentially very large numbers of interactions, one immediately
sees the need to drop stationary linear representations. The elements of a dynamic system simply
cannot continuously influence each other in an invariant way. For example,  if some personality
characteristics  contribute  to  one  another  monotonically,  their  scores  will  grow  unbounded.
Likewise, if the connections are negative and characteristics inhibit each other, they could quickly
almost  'vanish'.  These are  unlikely  scenarios  for  psychological  processes,  at  least  pertaining  to
normal development. To avoid this, the characteristics being modeled have to have either natural
boundaries, negative feedback loops within traits, or both positive and negative connections that
balance each other. 
Cramer and colleagues (2012) describe personality as a system that strives for equilibria
with environment: people actively select environments that match some of their characteristics and
receive reinforcing feedback from these environments. However, settling for an equilibrium which
requires  and  sustains  some  characteristics  may  imply  negative  feedback  loops  for  other
characteristics  because the kinds of behavioral,  cognitive,  and affective activity  that  personality
characteristics reflect is likely to be a limited resource. There is only so much a person can do at a
time. For example,  when a person is gregarious and often settles for the situations that activate
characteristics  that  tend  to  go  with  social  activity  such  as  being  friendly,  co-operative,  and
sympathetic, he or she almost inevitably has less time for practicing musical instruments or reading
poetry—behaviors reflecting Openness characteristics—or working extra hours to get a fast-track
promotion, and the person may have less of a chance for cultivating a melancholic mood. Positive
connections between some characteristics in the personality system automatically implying negative
connections  elsewhere  prevents  the system from “exploding”  or  “vanishing.”  When individuals
settle for an equilibrium with their environment that chronically promotes some characteristics and
inhibits others, then this can account for the stability of individual differences, among other reasons
such as genetic influences on personality “wiring.” Another illustration of the kinds of negative
feedback loops that sustain stability is the above-described finding that feeling energetic precedes
(physical) activity, whereas the level of the characteristic decreases afterwards, possibly reflecting
exhaustion.
Combining the personality feature space, networks and underlying traits
Here,  we describe  an idea  concerning how one can think of  personality  as  a  system of
characteristics  and  forces  that  interact  with  them.  This  is  a  conceptual  representation  that  is
(currently) not empirically estimable, but it shows how the network and latent trait approaches can,
in principle, be combined into one framework.
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As discussed above,  people  can be represented as person vectors  in  a multidimensional
personality feature space. If we allow the feature space to evolve over time, it can accommodate
personality change (short term fluctuations and general developmental trends alike) in addition to
individual differences. This is because person vectors that can change their length and direction. For
the change to happen, including for person vectors to get to the positions they would then tend to
settle in for much of the time (which causes the stability in personality), there have to be some
forces that “pull them.” We argue that (a) these forces can also be thought of as vectors in this
feature space and (b) the network connections among personality features that make up the space
constitute a “bridge” between the forces and person vectors.
The force vectors may represent general environmental niches that pertain to all personality
characteristics (pull them all in a particular direction) or specific influences that only pull some
characteristics. The force vectors may represent other people: one person’s vector can be a force
vector for others, allowing people and their social environments to transact. For example, if people
interact with others, their personality automatically becomes part of their own social environment
by  influencing  it  and  this  environment  will  then  automatically  reinforce  their  pre-existing
characteristics.  Such inter-person transactions  may, among other  things,  cause  the  clustering  of
person vectors that can then be identified as factors or principal components. The force vectors can
also represent time-invariant genetic influences: person vectors' baseline positions in the personality
space that they tend to gravitate toward. But the force vectors can also include latent factors that
pull only  particular personality characteristics toward particular values (DeYoung, 2015). It was
discussed above that components/factors identified by PCA/FA can be represented as vectors in the
multidimensional feature space, so considering them as forces that pull person vectors in particular
directions is a straightforward step. Of course, when latent factors become better understood, they
can be taken apart into separate force vectors or, when the components of latent factors become
observed, they can be turned into additional dimensions of the personality space. In principle, there
is no limit to the flexibility of this personality representation.
All these forces can simultaneously act on a person vector at any given time: they pull the
person vector toward a “target” vector in personality feature space that represents the combined
influence of these forces. This target vector of length k (v) can be operationalized as a resultant of
the relevant force vectors, which can be appropriately weighed (e.g., the force vector representing
genetic  influences  can  be  weighed  by  a  heritability  estimate).  Since  updating  person  vector  y
requires  a  connection  matrix  W (because  yt =  yt-1W),  the target  vector  v has  be turned into  a
connection matrix. As a simple solution, this can be done by treating v as the principal eigenvector
of the connection matrix (the eigenvector that has a corresponding eigenvalue of 1 whereas all other
possible  eigenvectors  correspond  to  eigenvalues  of  0).  So,  if  Q denotes  a  k by  k matrix  of
eigenvectors such that the first column contains the target vector  v and the other columns contain
just  random vectors  orthogonal  to  v (e.g.,  reflecting  some  stochastic  noise),  and  Λ denotes  a
diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of the eigenvectors in Q such that the
first eigenvalue is 1 and all others zero, then W = QΛQ-1 (the random vectors in the second to kth
column of Q are really only required to make Q invertable). In technical terms, given the updating
rule of  y, W projects it orthogonally onto the direction of v (eigenvalues of 1 and 0 is a defining
property  of  an  orthogonal  projection  matrix).  In  simple  terms,  such  projection  makes  the
connections among personality characteristics a bridge between a person vector's current state and
any  force  that  act  on  them  at  the  time,  whether  these  forces  reflect  underlying  propensities,
influences from other people, or anything else.
Therefore, what we consider to be underlying traits—some directions in personality feature
space that pull person vectors toward them—can in principle be accommodated within the network
approach, because they can contribute to the connections among characteristics. Furthermore, when
more specific, but still  unobserved, components of the underlying traits are delineated, they can
become  additional  force  vectors  in  the  feature  space  and  thereby  separate  contributors  to  the
network connections. Or, when the components of the underlying traits become observed, they can
The coalescence of traits       15
be explicitly represented as dimensions of the feature space.
The strengths of the network approach and the proposed common framework
Richness and flexibility
In comparison to the underlying trait paradigm, the network approach provides a richer and
more flexible representation of personality and so does our proposed framework that can combine
the underlying trait and network approaches. It is richer in that it combines individual differences
with processes happening within individuals and between individuals and their environments. It is
more flexible in that it does not have to be richer: it can only be used for re-assembling the kinds of
data that the underlying trait paradigm typically generates, sometimes potentially offering additional
insights. In fact, the network approach appears more generic than the underlying trait one in that it
can accommodate the latter, especially when the proposed framework is considered.
An account of complex personality structure
Not  only  can  the  network  approach  account  for  the  coalescence  of  personality
characteristics, but it can also explain why their structural relations are as “messy” as they appear.
As discussed above, factor analysis of personality characteristics wrestles with characteristics being
associated with multiple ostensible underlying traits and having residual correlations that require
postulating increasingly more specific underlying traits underneath the broader ones (the personality
hierarchy). According to the network approach, broader factors represent bigger “chunks” of the
interconnected network and it is natural that there are also direct edges between the nodes in these
somewhat separate chunks—simply because it is a network. Furthermore, as nodes that are closer to
each other are more strongly connected (directly or via other nodes) than more distant nodes, this
explains  the  residual  correlations  within the  chunks  and  can  account  for  what  appears  as  the
personality hierarchy. If so, there is no inevitable need for postulating different levels of hierarchy
such  as,  for  example,  the  General  Factor  of  Personality  (Rushton  et  al.,  2008),  the
Stability/Plasticity level (DeYoung, 2006), the FFM level (R. R. McCrae & John, 1992), the aspects
level (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007), the facets level (Costa & McCrae, 1992) or the nuances
level (Mõttus, Kandler, et al., in press).
Consistency with how personality is linked with its possible causes and consequences
Constituents of the same traits often demonstrate different links with factors that possibly
contribute  to  personality  variance  as  well  as  with  phenomena  that  might  receive  causal
contributions  from personality  (outcomes;  Mõttus,  2016).  For  example,  Mõttus  and  colleagues
(2015) found that facets of the same FFM traits and items of the same facets tended show different
correlations with age, which could not be accounted for by difference in the degrees to which the
facets reflected the FFM traits or items reflected the facets. To the extent that such findings hold, the
only way to reconcile them with the underlying trait perspective is to conclude that it tends to be the
item-specific variance that is related to the etiological factors or outcomes of personality, rather than
whatever the items share and that thereby could reflect the underlying traits. In many cases, this
may make the latent traits redundant for any practical or conceptual purposes. Such findings are,
however, consistent with the network perspective because it conceives of personality characteristics
as autonomous components with their own etiology and consequences (i.e., incoming and outgoing
connections).
Consistency with what we know about the genetics of personality
The  specific  genetic  variants  contributing  to  population  variance  in  personality  have
remained  elusive,  although  twin  studies  have  consistently  shown at  least  moderate  heritability
estimates  for personality  traits,  regardless of their  breadth or flavor  (Turkheimer, Pettersson,  &
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Horn, 2014; Vukasovic & Bratko, 2015). Collectively, hundreds of thousands of genetic variants
can explain up to about 15% of variance in the traits, sometimes much less (Okbay et al., 2016; van
den Berg et al., 2016), but few, if any, specific genetic variants that are robustly linked with the
traits have been identified to date. 
There  are  numerous  explanations  for  this.  Conceiving  of  personality  as  a  network  of
characteristics is one of them. At every stage of development, individuals' node scores are partly
influenced by their genetic make-up, but these genetic influences may not be aligned with particular
groups of characteristics (i.e., chunks of personality network that we conceive of as traits) but with
individual characteristics and their interconnections (Cramer et al., 2012). If so, genetic influences
could  be  more  fruitfully  identified  for  either  these  specific  characteristics  or  for  the  network
connections. This explanation is consistent with the findings that random collections of personality
test items show heritability estimates similar to “real” trait scores (Johnson et al., 2011) and that
even the residual variance of single test items is often heritable (Mõttus, Kandler, et al., in press).
A reason  for  why  heritability  of  personality  traits  appears  higher  in  twin  studies  than
family/adoption studies (Vukasovic & Bratko, 2015) or based on molecular genetic data (Okbay et
al.,  2016; van den Berg et al.,  2016) is that the genetic variance is to some extent non-additive
(Keller, Coventry, Heath, & Martin, 2005; Vinkhuyzen, van der Sluis, Maes, & Posthuma, 2012).
Non-additive genetic variance depends on interactions within the same genetic locus (dominance)
or  across  genetic  loci  (epsitasis).  The  network  perspective  on  the  coalescence  of  personality
characteristics is consistent with the trait scores appearing to reflect non-additive genetic variance in
addition to additive influences. In particular, genetic effects on nodes or direct connections between
nodes may be more likely to contribute to additive variance,  whereas indirect  connections  may
result in what appears as (epistatic) non-additive effects. 
Figure 4.  Genetic variance in a trait consisting of characteristics x, z, y, and u may appear as
partly non-additive. Characteristic x contributes to characteristic y via gene set A additively along
with direct connection from characteristics u an z. However, x also contributes to y indirectly via
characteristics  z  and  u  and  characteristic  z  contributes  indirectly  via  characteristic  x.  The
realizations of these indirect connections simultaneously depends on the combination of multiple
sets of genes.
For example, imagine the network depicted in Figure 4. Node y may be directly connected
to nodes x, z, and u and these connections are respectively controlled by gene sets A, C, and E (for
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simplicity, let's assume that these gene sets are independent). As a result, x, z, and u can additively
either contribute or inhibit y. However, y can also be influenced by x indirectly via z and u, whereas
these connections are controlled by gene sets B and C, and D and E, respectively. Whether these
indirect  contributions  from  x reach  y,  may depend on the multiplicative effect  of the gene sets
involved in the indirect pathways and this may result in some epistatic genetic effects. For example,
node  x may positively contribute to  y via direct connection controlled by gene set A but if either
gene set B or D cause node x to inhibit nodes z and y, respectively, then y may indirectly inhibit y,
depending  on the  sign  of  the  connections  from  z and  u to  y.  Likewise,  node  z  can  indirectly
contribute to y via x, but this depends on whether both gene sets F and A allow for this. 
Lack of robust environmental correlates
Although  the  far-from-unity  heritability  of  personality  traits  suggests  that  there  are  ubiquitous
environmental  effects  on  personality,  the  specific  factors  that  robustly  contribute  to  the
environmental variance in traits have remained elusive. This is consistent with the network-based
explanation for trait coalescence. The influences specific to single characteristics can produce only
temporary  effects,  because  once the  exogenous force is  removed from the characteristics,  their
scores  may  gradually  return  to  the  values  that  are  influenced  by  their  connections  with  other
characteristics  (i.e.,  the  “wiring”  of  personality).  Effects  on  the  connections among  nodes  can
produce more lasting changes as they could entail changes in the equilibrium state. However, as the
effects on connections entail changes in how the personality activity (the limited resource discussed
above) is distributed among the characteristics, they likely propagate throughout the whole network.
This makes it hard to associate external effects with changes in specific groups of characteristics
(traits).
The limitations of the network approach
The  underlying  trait  paradigm  has  been  the  workhorse  of  personality  psychology  for
decades, whereas the network approach is a new kid on the block. Because of its novelty, there is
very  little  research  that  has  even  attempted  to  operationalize  the  network  representation  of
personality. As a result, there is little empirical support for it and even the methodology for gaining
the empirical  support is  underdeveloped.  But as studies of within-individual  variability  become
increasingly popular, aided by mobile technology, and the statistical tools for handling the complex
dataset develop (e.g., Epskamp et al., 2016), this situation is poised to change. And it could change
rapidly.
The network approach lacks the conceptual simplicity and parsimony of the underlying trait
approach. Thinking of personality, measuring it,  linking it with variables outside the personality
domain and communicating the findings would be easy indeed if everything that is important about
personality was a few underlying but indirectly measurable trait structures, possible reducible to
some simple psychobiological principles with identifiable genetic and environmental etiology. The
network representation  of  personality  is  so much more complex as the number of  autonomous
components it must encompass is potentially very large and the number of potential associations
among them increase exponentially as the number of components grows. Furthermore, to entangle
these associations, researchers would need to see how they change over time and in interaction with
environments. This is a daunting task indeed and one can only hope that the apparent complexity
will be reducible to some overarching principles that govern the dynamic processes. For example,
the  conceptual  model  representing  personality  as  a  system characteristics  and forces  that  have
mathematically formalized relationships may go some way in this direction.
One of the most  compelling  arguments  for the underlying trait  perspective  is  the cross-
cultural replicability of trait structure (see above). This evidence is parsimoniously explained by
there being universal underlying structures that cause variance and co-variance of particular types
of  characteristics.  To the  extent  that  the  network  approach  accommodates  the  underlying  trait
approach, it can benefit from this parsimonious explanation, but then the rest of what the network
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approach allows may become redundant. However, it is plausible that the direct causal connections
between personality  characteristics,  the crux of the network approach,  are also recurrent  across
specific sociocultural contexts. It is plausible that researchers' tend to overestimate the degree to
which different cultures vary from these of their own. Perhaps doing something foolish leads to
later guilt and sadness everywhere. Future research may address this question.
Conclusion
The chapter compared two explanations for the coalescence of personality characteristics
into broader traits. The paradigm of broad underlying traits is well established, but suffers from
some limitations such as being inconclusively supported by empirical  data  and being unable to
account for processes within individuals that give rise to observable individual differences.  The
network approach has only been around for a very short time and has therefore been able to attract a
limited amount of empirical research. In theory, it can account for some of the limitations of the
underlying broad trait paradigm. For example, the very foundational idea of the approach—that of
direct  causal  connections  between  the  specific  characteristic  that  constitute  personality—can
account for the complex structure of personality characteristics without any need to bring in ad hoc
explanations such as numerous new underlying causal influences stepping in at increasingly more
specific levels of personality hierarchy. Likewise, the approach, in principle, explain how individual
differences  emerge  from  processes  within  individuals  and  individual's  transactions  with
environment. We also reviewed a number of other empirical findings that are consistent with the
network  approach-based  explanation  to  personality.  Moreover,  some  data  analytic  tools  that
originate from the network approach can be used to gain novel insights from the kinds of data that
typically pertain to the underlying trait approach.
However, despite the two approaches appearing very different at the outset, we provided a
more general, mathematically formalized framework that can, in principle, combine the two. To us,
it  seems  that  there  is  no  inevitable  need  to  see  the  two  approaches  as  opposing  each  other.
Combining what has already been established with what may be achieved with novel approaches
rather than pitting the established and new approaches against each other may be the best way
forward. 
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